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Delayed reconﬁguration of a non-emotional task set through reactivation
of an emotional task set in task switching: an ageing study
Natalie Berger, Anne Richards and Eddy J. Davelaar
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
In our everyday life, we frequently switch between diﬀerent tasks, a faculty that
changes with age. However, it is still not understood how emotion impacts on age-
related changes in task switching. Using faces with emotional and neutral
expressions, Experiment 1 investigated younger (n = 29; 18–38 years old) and older
adults’ (n = 32; 61–80 years old) ability to switch between an emotional and a non-
emotional task (i.e. responding to the face’s expression vs. age). In Experiment 2,
younger and older adults also viewed emotional and neutral faces, but switched
between two non-emotional tasks (i.e. responding to the face’s age vs. gender).
Data from Experiment 1 demonstrated that switching from an emotional to a non-
emotional task was slower when the expression of the new face was emotional
rather than neutral. This impairment was observed in both age groups. In contrast,
Experiment 2 revealed that neither younger nor older adults were aﬀected by
block-wise irrelevant emotion when switching between two non-emotional tasks.
Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that task-irrelevant emotion can impair task switching
through reactivation of the competing emotional task set. They also suggest that
this eﬀect and the ability to shield task-switching performance from block-wise
irrelevant emotion are preserved in ageing.
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Switching between diﬀerent tasks is so common in
everyday life that we are often not even aware that
we perform task switching. For instance, putting
together a shopping list requires switching between
thinking of ingredients you need, checking for them
in cupboards, and writing them down. The ability to
switch between tasks is a core executive function
that plays an important role in everyday functioning
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000) and
given evidence that emotion can aﬀect executive func-
tions (Pessoa, 2009, 2015, 2017), research has also
started to assess interactions between emotion and
task switching (Aboulaﬁa-Brakha, Manuel, & Ptak,
2016; de Vries & Geurts, 2012; Gul & Khan, 2014;
Johnson, 2009; Paulitzki, Risko, Oakman, & Stolz,
2008; Piguet et al., 2013, 2016; Reeck & Egner, 2015).
However, emotional task switching in ageing has not
been investigated despite evidence of age-related
changes in both executive functions (Babcock & Salt-
house, 1990; Braver &West, 2008; MacPherson, Phillips,
& Della Sala, 2002; Reuter-Lorenz & Sylvester, 2005;
Salthouse, 1990, 1991; Zelazo, Craik, & Booth, 2004)
and in emotional functioning (Blanchard-Fields, 2007;
Blanchard-Fields, Mienaltowski, & Seay, 2007; Carsten-
sen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Gross
et al., 1997; Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009; Scheibe & Blan-
chard-Fields, 2009). The present study was conducted
to close this empirical gap by comparing emotional
task switching in younger and older adults.
Task switching and the role of emotions
Switching between tasks is usually associated with
slower reaction times (RTs) and more errors compared
to repeating a task, which is referred to as the switch
cost (Kiesel et al., 2010; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Meiran,
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Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Monsell, 2003; Rogers & Monsell,
1995; Wylie & Allport, 2000). Multiple processes are
thought to contribute to switch costs, including task
set reconﬁguration (Monsell, 2003; Rogers & Monsell,
1995), which relates to the engagement with the
new task, as well as proactive interference from the
no longer relevant task on switch trials (Allport,
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Wylie & Allport, 2000), which
relates to the disengagement from the previous task.
Studies investigating the eﬀects of emotion on task
switching have primarily focused on comparing the
switch costs associated with switching between an
emotional and a non-emotional task, but the results
are equivocal. Some studies showed that switching
away from an emotional to a non-emotional task
took longer than vice versa (Johnson, 2009; Paulitzki
et al., 2008), others reported evidence suggesting
that non-emotional tasks are more diﬃcult to switch
to and away from relative to emotional tasks (Reeck
& Egner, 2015; Schuch, Werheid, & Koch, 2012),
whereas no diﬀerences in switch costs between
emotional and non-emotional tasks were found in
another study (Gul & Khan, 2014). Given these mixed
results, it is still an open question how emotion
aﬀects task switching and if it aﬀects sub-processes
such as task set reconﬁguration or proactive interfer-
ence diﬀerently.
It should be noted that these studies varied in the
applied methodology, which could have contributed
to inconsistent ﬁndings. Studies reporting higher
costs for switches from emotional to non-emotional
tasks than vice versa (Johnson, 2009; Paulitzki et al.,
2008) have used tasks that varied in perceptual sal-
ience and size (e.g. response to a large, real-life
picture of a spider in the emotional task vs. response
to a small number placed over the spider’s back in
the neutral task). The salience of emotional stimuli
due to size alone could have contributed to greater
switch costs from emotional to non-emotional tasks
than vice versa. Other studies (Gul & Khan, 2014;
Reeck & Egner, 2015; Schuch et al., 2012) used tasks
with perceptually balanced stimuli by asking partici-
pants to respond to the expression of a face in the
emotional task and to the gender or age of a face
in non-emotional task. However, emotional stimuli
were either used on every trial (Reeck & Egner,
2015; Schuch et al., 2012), or no distinction
between emotional (i.e. happy) and neutral trials
was made in the analysis (Gul & Khan, 2014). Given
that continuous presentation of emotional material
can lead to habituation (Breiter et al., 1996; Phan,
Liberzon, Welsh, Britton, & Taylor, 2003; Zald, 2003),
this might have facilitated switching to a non-
emotional task set in studies with emotional material
only. Moreover, the notion that faster switching to a
non-emotional than to an emotional task was due
to the inhibition of the more dominant emotional
task set (Reeck & Egner, 2015) cannot be tested
without a comparison between switches to emotional
and neutral items in the non-emotional task. It is also
possible that emotion aﬀected sub-processes such as
reconﬁguration and interference diﬀerently despite
no overall diﬀerences in switch costs between
emotional and non-emotional tasks sets in Gul and
Khan’s (2014) study. Additionally, Gul and Khan
(2014) used happy faces, whereas only negative
(e.g. threat-related pictures) or a mix of positive and
negative items (e.g. happy and angry faces) were
used as emotional material in other studies
(Johnson, 2009; Paulitzki et al., 2008; Reeck & Egner,
2015; Schuch et al., 2012). This might have contribu-
ted to diﬀerent patterns of results. Finally, repeat and
switch trials were not always balanced between com-
peting tasks in previous research, which might have
aﬀected the results. For instance, (Johnson, 2009)
used three times more repetition trials for the
emotion relative to the non-emotional task, which
might have aﬀected participants’ ability to disengage
from the emotional task and/or to reconﬁgure the
non-emotional task.
The role of repeat trials in task switching indeed
deserves further attention as many previous
studies have used switch cost as the dependent vari-
able. However, subtracting the latencies of repeat
from those of switch trials makes it impossible to
disentangle whether the diﬀerence is driven by
(faster) repeat or (slower) switch responses. As the
experimental design of previous studies allowed
for response repetition on repeat trials, this might
have contributed to particularly fast repeat
responses on average and thus, to higher switch
costs. Furthermore, processing of emotional items
is known to be particularly eﬃcient (e.g. Phelps &
LeDoux, 2005; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006), and
thus, it is possible that the speed-up eﬀect for
repeat trials was particularly pronounced for
responses to emotional (e.g. expression of a face)
rather than non-emotional item features (e.g.
gender of a face). In sum, it is possible that there
were diﬀerences between switch costs for emotional
and non-emotional tasks due to eﬀects on repeat
rather than on switch trials.
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Task switching between emotional and non-
emotional tasks in ageing
Research suggests that ageing is associated with
reduced ability to maintain and schedule two
diﬀerent tasks in working memory (Reimers &
Maylor, 2005; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Wasylyshyn,
Verhaeghen, & Sliwinski, 2011), which is labelled
global task switching and examined by comparing
performance in single-task blocks with performance
in blocks with multiple tasks requiring task switching.
In contrast, no general impairments were found for
the ability to activate and deactivate task sets
ﬂexibly, which is labelled local task switching and
assessed by comparing performance on switch and
repeat trials (Reimers & Maylor, 2005; Verhaeghen &
Cerella, 2002; Wasylyshyn et al., 2011). However, age-
related diﬀerences in local task switching were
found to emerge, for instance, when the number of
tasks were increased from two to four and when
unpredictable switching was required (Kray, Li, & Lin-
denberger, 2002). The present study was conducted
to extend previous research by investigating
whether local task switching is also aﬀected diﬀerently
by emotion in younger and older adults.
According to previous research, older adults tend
to direct their attention to positive and away from
negative material (for reviews, see Reed & Carstensen,
2012; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010), which could aﬀect
their ability to engage with or disengage from
emotional items during task switching. The socioemo-
tional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 1993)
suggests that older adults focus on positive material
to enhance their well-being, which results in the posi-
tivity eﬀect in ageing. A diﬀerent view comes from the
dynamic integration theory (see Labouvie-Vief, 2003,
2009 for reviews), which links the positivity eﬀect
with age-related cognitive decline by stating that
older adults tend to avoid cognitively more demand-
ing negative aﬀect. Although these theories suggest
diﬀerent underlying mechanisms for the positivity
eﬀect in ageing, both would predict that older
adults engage more readily with positive than with
negative material and disengage more readily from
negative than from positive material. In a task-switch-
ing task, this could lead to age-related changes in the
ability to switch to or away from positive and negative
items despite unimpaired local task switching in
ageing. To assess the eﬀects of emotion on the
reconﬁguration of the new task and the interference
from the previous task, the valences of the target
item and the previous item were considered in Exper-
iment 1 and the following hypotheses were tested:
Reconﬁguration account
If emotion aﬀects engagementwith thenew task, target
emotion is expected to inﬂuence task switching. Given
that emotional material is more salient than neutral
material, emotional items will be easier to engage
with relative to neutral items. Given older adults’ prefer-
ence for positive material, it is expected that older but
not younger adultswill be faster to engagewithpositive
compared to neutral or negative items.
Interference account
If emotion aﬀects interference from the previous task,
previous emotion is expected to inﬂuence task switch-
ing. It is possible that emotional items will be more
diﬃcult to disengage from relative to neutral items
due to their enhanced salience. Given older adults’
preference for positive material, it can be expected
that older but not younger adults will be slower to dis-




Thirty-two younger (18–38 years old) and 32 older
adults (61–80 years old) participated in Experiment 1
(see Table 1 for participant characteristics). The
sample size was determined on the basis of related
work with similar experimental conditions (Gul &
Khan, 2014; Reeck & Egner, 2015). Three younger par-
ticipants were excluded from the analysis due to
failure to follow instructions, resulting in a ﬁnal
sample of 29 younger and 32 older adults. Younger
adults were undergraduate and postgraduate stu-
dents at Birkbeck, University of London, and older
adults were community-dwelling volunteers recruited
from the University of the Third Age in London. All par-
ticipants received a small fee for taking part. They
reported to be in good health and to have normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. They were
pre-screened for psychiatric disorders and a history
of neurological disorders. Older adults had a score of
27 or above on the MMSE (Folstein, Folstein, &
McHugh, 1975).
As can be seen in Table 1, older adults had better
verbal knowledge than younger adults as assessed
with the NART (Nelson & Willison, 1991) and scored
COGNITION AND EMOTION 3
lower on the Digit Symbol Substitution Test (Wechsler,
1955) suggesting slower processing speed than in
younger adults. These results of better vocabulary
knowledge (Alwin & McCammon, 2001; Bowles,
Grimm, & McArdle, 2005) and slower processing
speed (Salthouse, 1996, 2000) in older than younger
adults are consistent with typical ﬁndings in ageing
research. No further diﬀerences were observed
between the two age groups. This study was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of the
ethics board of Birkbeck, University of London. All par-
ticipants gave written informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
Stimuli consisted of 48 images of faces from the FACES
database (Ebner, Riediger, & Lindenberger, 2010), a
validated set of colour photographs of naturalistic,
front-facing faces of diﬀerent ages. In a preliminary
rating study (Berger, Richards, & Davelaar, 2017), ten
younger (21–32 years old; M = 27.80, SD = 3.12) and
ten older adults (66–76 years old; M = 71.27, SD =
3.13) rated the valence and arousal of 234 preselected
faces. Sixteen happy, 16 angry and 16 neutral
expressions with the highest agreement between
younger and older raters were then selected for the
main experiment. The age group (younger, older)
and sex (male, female) of the faces were balanced in
each emotion category and each picture showed a
unique individual. For counterbalancing purposes,
two face sets with similar arousal and valence levels
(all ts(19) < 1.30, ps < .208) were created.
Procedure
After giving informed consent, participants completed
a demographic questionnaire and were seated in front
of a computer screen. A visual acuity test (Bach, 1996)
was conducted at a distance of 65 cm to ensure that
vision was in the normal range. Participants were
then instructed to remain at this distance to the
screen and to perform the computerised task,
which was prepared and presented using E-Prime
Version 2.0.10.353 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto,
2002) on a 24-inch computer screen with a resolution
of 1920 × 1200 pixels. To allow for binary responses,
the task consisted of two blocks: one comprising 16
unique faces of younger and older adults with
neutral and happy expressions and one comprising
16 unique faces of younger and older adults with
neutral and angry expressions. In each block, 160
faces were presented in a random order: 40 were
young and neutral, 40 were young and emotional,
40 were old and neutral and 40 were old and
emotional. Each face was viewed approximately 10
times per block. Faces from diﬀerent subsets were
presented in each block to ensure that neutral
faces, which were included in both blocks, were
diﬀerent across blocks. The order of the blocks was
counterbalanced across participants. Participants
had the option to take short breaks every 40 trials,
resulting in three breaks per block and a break
between blocks. The task was preceded by 16
unscored practice trials.
In each trial, participants viewed one face at a time
that was presented in the left top quarter, the right top
quarter, the bottom right quarter or the bottom left
quarter of the screen. A horizontal line separated the
top and bottom of the screen and was visible for the
duration of the whole block. Face presentation,
which was preceded by a ﬁxation cross for 500 ms in
the relevant location, always started in the left top
quarter and continued clockwise before starting
again in the left top quarter. Participants were
instructed to respond to the age of the face by
Table 1. Participant characteristics.
Younger adults Older adults Group diﬀerence
Variable M SD M SD t p
Age 25.34 5.86 70.93 5.25 −31.50 <.001
Gender (male:female) 14:15 9:23
Years of education 16.86 3.16 15.73 2.94 1.42 .160
NART Verbal IQ 106.48 7.74 117.30 5.45 −6.80 <.001
Digit Symbol Test 70.52 12.80 52.63 12.72 5.38 <.001
BDI II 4.96 5.32 4.00 4.14 .77 .446
STAI Trait Anxiety 37.82 11.78 32.87 8.61 1.84 .072
MMSE 29.17 .91
Note: NART = The National Adult Reading Test, BDI II = Beck Depression Inventory II, STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, MMSE = Mini-Mental
State Examination.
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pressing one of two buttons (“young” vs. “old”) when
the face was presented above (or below) the horizon-
tal line and to the emotion of the face by pressing one
of two buttons (“neutral” vs. “emotional”) when the
face was presented below (or above) a horizontal
line. Button presses initiated the next trial after the
presentation of a blank screen (with the horizontal
line) for 200 ms. Task assignment to the top or
bottom half of the screen was counterbalanced
across participants, as was the labelling of the keys.
Task switching was associated with hand switching:
responses to the task on the top half of the screen
were assigned to the left hand and responses to the
task on the bottom half of the screen were assigned
to the right hand to avoid conﬂict at the response
level. On a regular PC computer keyboard, the
buttons “S” and “D” as well as “K” and “L” were used.
An example of a trial sequence is presented in
Figure 1.
After the computer task, participants completed
the Digit Symbol Substitution Test (Wechsler, 1955),
the NART (Nelson & Willison, 1991), the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Carbin,
1988) and the A-Trait version of the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch,
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Older adults addition-
ally completed the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975). Partici-
pants were debriefed at the end of the session, which
lasted 60–75 min.
Design and statistical analysis
Responses and RTs were recorded for each trial. For
the analyses of RTs, any RTs faster than 200 ms or
2.5 standard deviations above or below the age
group’s mean RTs were excluded, resulting in an
exclusion of an average of 2.86% of trials for
younger adults and 2.51% for older adults. Accuracy
and median RTs for correct trials were calculated for
each condition. As explained further above, the
hypotheses related to the eﬀects of emotion and
age on switch trials and thus, only analyses for
switch trials are reported below. Separate analyses
for repeat trials are reported in the Supplemental
Material.
Statistical analysis of the data was conducted with
SPSS 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). Accuracy and RTs in
the happy vs. neutral and the angry vs. neutral blocks
were analysed separately. Data were analysed by a 2 ×
2 × 2 × 2 mixed factors ANOVA with the within-
subjects factors task (age vs. emotion), target
emotion (happy/angry vs. neutral) and previous
emotion (happy/angry vs. neutral) and the between-
subjects factor age (younger vs. older). Post-hoc t-
tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the 5% alpha
level were performed to follow up signiﬁcant inter-
actions. Due to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the two age
groups’ verbal knowledge and processing speed, all
analyses were repeated with NART verbal IQ and
Digit Symbol as centred covariates. The results with
age as a factor reported here were qualitatively the
same and signiﬁcant in the analysis including covari-
ates unless stated otherwise.
Results
Happy vs. neutral faces
Accuracy
Accuracy for performance in the happy vs. neutral task
block in younger and older adults is presented in
Figure 2 (top panels). The four-way omnibus ANOVA
revealed a main eﬀect of age, F(1, 59) = 11.12, MSE
= .005, p = .001, partial η2 = .16, as older adults were
more accurate (M = 98.7%, SD = 2.1%) than younger
adults (M = 96.7%, SD = 2.8%). No further signiﬁcant
main eﬀects or interactions were observed for accu-
racy for happy vs. neutral faces (all Fs < 3.00).
Reaction times
RTs for performance in the happy vs. neutral task block
in younger and older adults are presented in Figure 2
(bottom panels). The four-way omnibus ANOVA
yielded a main eﬀect of task, F(1, 59) = 17.40, MSE =
89530, p < .001, partial η2 = .23, with overall slower
RTs in the emotion task (M = 1153 ms, SD = 343 ms)
compared to the age task (M = 1041 ms, SD =
323 ms). This main eﬀect was qualiﬁed by a task ×
target emotion interaction, F(1, 59) = 4.14, MSE =
21865, p = .046, partial η2 = .07. Follow-up t-tests
revealed that in the age task, RTs were slower for
happy targets (M = 1064 ms, SD = 329 ms) than for
neutral targets (M = 1018 ms, SD = 332 ms), t(60) =
2.50, p = .015. In the emotion task, there was no signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between RTs for neutral or happy
targets (p = .650). Finally, there was also a main
eﬀect of age, F(1, 59) = 11.81, MSE = 676967, p = .001,
partial η2 = .17, as older adults were overall slower
(M = 1219 ms, SD = 329 ms) than younger adults (M
= 963 ms, SD = 242 ms). No further signiﬁcant main
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eﬀects or interactions were observed for RTs to happy
vs. neutral faces (all Fs < 3.10).
Angry vs. neutral faces
Accuracy
Accuracy scores for performance in the angry vs.
neutral task block in younger and older adults are pre-
sented in Figure 3 (top panels). The four-way omnibus
ANOVA yielded a main eﬀect of task, F(1, 59) = 14.99,
MSE = .007, p < .001, partial η2 = .20, as accuracy
scores were higher in the age task (M = 98.0%, SD =
3.0%) than in the emotion task (M = 95.0%, SD =
5.8%). There was also a main eﬀect of target
emotion, F(1, 59) = 7.58, MSE = .006, p = .008, partial
η2 = .11, with lower accuracy scores for angry targets
(M = 95.5%, SD = 5.6%) than for neutral targets (M =
97.6%, SD = 3.2%). This main eﬀect was qualiﬁed by
a task × target emotion interaction, F(1, 59) = 7.58,
MSE = .006, p = .008, partial η2 = .11. Follow-up t-tests
revealed that in the emotion task, accuracy was
lower for angry targets (M = 93.0%, SD = 9.7%) than
for neutral targets (M = 97.0%, SD = 4.3%), t(60) =
3.32, p = .002, whereas in the age task, accuracy
scores for neutral and angry targets did not diﬀer (p
= .909). No further signiﬁcant main eﬀects or inter-
action were observed for accuracy scores for angry
vs. neutral faces (all Fs < 3.20).
Reaction times
RTs for performance in the angry vs. neutral task block
in younger and older adults are presented in Figure 3
(bottom panels). The four-way omnibus ANOVA
yielded a main eﬀect of task, F(1, 59) = 50.09, MSE =
49662, p < .001, partial η2 = .46, as participants were
slower in the emotion task (M = 1188 ms, SD =
315 ms) than in the age task (M = 1044 ms, SD =
287 ms). There was also a main eﬀect of target
emotion, F(1, 59) = 8.15, MSE = 38061, p = .006, partial
η2 = .12, with slower RTs for angry targets (M =
1141 ms, SD = 291 ms) relative to neutral targets (M
= 1091 ms, SD = 307 ms). This main eﬀect was
qualiﬁed by a task × target emotion interaction, F(1,
59) = 4.18, MSE = 32855, p = .045, partial η2 = .07. Sep-
arate analyses for the age task and the emotion task
revealed that in the age task, RTs were slower for
angry targets (M = 1087 ms, SD = 314 ms) than for
neutral targets (M = 1002 ms, SD = 283 ms), t(60) =
4.08, p < .001. In contrast, there was no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in RTs for neutral and angry targets in the
emotion task (p = .567). There was also a main eﬀect
of age, F(1, 59) = 8.43, MSE = 601596, p = .005, partial
η2 = .13. However, this eﬀect became non-signiﬁcant
(p = .102) when processing speed was included as a
covariate in the analysis. No further signiﬁcant main
eﬀects or interactions were observed for RTs for
angry vs. neutral faces (all Fs < 3.40).
Figure 1. Examples of trials with the instructions to respond to the emotion of the face if it is presented below the horizontal line (A) or to the age
of the face if it is presented above the horizontal line (B) in Experiment 1. As faces were presented clockwise, the examples show a repeat trial in
the emotion condition and a switch trial in the age condition.
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Discussion
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the eﬀects
of emotion on switching between emotional and
non-emotional tasks in younger and older adults.
The main ﬁnding was that both age groups were
slower when switching to emotional rather than
neutral faces in the non-emotional age task,
whereas no diﬀerences in RTs were observed for
switches to neutral and emotional faces in the
emotional expression task. Moreover, although the
emotion of the target, which they had to switch to,
modulated responses in both age groups, the
emotion of the item, which they had to switch away
from, did not. Lastly, there were no age-related
diﬀerences in task switching besides evidence of a
speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ in older adults.
The ﬁnding that participants were slower when
having to switch to an emotional face in the age
task suggests that trial-irrelevant emotion was pro-
cessed and impaired performance in both age
groups. One explanation for this eﬀect could be
that having just processed and responded to
emotional information in the emotional task made
it diﬃcult for participants to switch to the non-
emotional task (option 1). This would be in accord-
ance with the suggestion that proactive interference
from the no longer relevant task aﬀects task switch-
ing (Allport et al., 1994; Wylie & Allport, 2000).
Another explanation (option 2) could be that it
Figure 2. Accuracy (upper panels) and RTs for correct responses (lower panels) in younger (left-hand panels) and older adults (right-hand panels)
as a function of target emotion and previous emotion in Experiment 1. Participants switched between the age task (with task-irrelevant emotion)
and the emotion task (with task-relevant emotion). This ﬁgure shows data from the happy vs. neutral task block. Only switch trials are presented
in this ﬁgure. Error bars represent SEM.
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simply took longer to identify a face’s age if the face
was emotional rather than neutral, as evidence
suggests that emotional expressions can aﬀect age
ratings (Ganel, 2015; Voelkle, Ebner, Lindenberger, &
Riediger, 2012). Alternatively, it is possible that
emotional items triggered trial-irrelevant emotional
processing either in an automatic fashion (option 3)
or through reactivation of the competing emotional
task set (option 4). Exogenous factors may play an
important part in task switching through cueing of
task sets (Kiesel et al., 2010; Rogers & Monsell, 1995;
Rubin & Koch, 2006). Thus, it is possible that
emotional items slowed down responses in the
non-emotional task set relative to neutral items as
they cued the currently irrelevant emotional task set.
Repeat trials were analysed (see Supplemental
Material) to rule out some of these explanations. The
analyses showed that RTs were slower for emotional
compared to neutral target items for repeat trials in
the age task just as it was the case for switch trials.
Although this does not allow evaluating the validity
of options 2, 3, and 4, it helps to eliminate option 1,
according to which RTs for emotional trials were
slower relative to neutral trials due to the diﬃculty
to disengage from the emotion task of the previous
trial. Given that RTs for repeat trials were faster than
for switch trials, it can be assumed that participants
were (at least to some degree) able to reconﬁgure
the new non-emotional task set. Thus, it seems unli-
kely that the diﬃculty to disengage from the
Figure 3. Accuracy (upper panel) and RTs for correct responses (lower panel) in younger (left-hand panel) and older adults (right-hand panel) as a
function of target emotion and previous emotion in Experiment 1. Participants switched between the age task (with task-irrelevant emotion) and
the emotion task (with task-relevant emotion). This ﬁgure shows data from the angry vs. neutral task block. Only switch trials are presented in this
ﬁgure. Error bars represent SEM.
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previously performed emotion task was responsible
for the similar pattern of longer RTs for emotional rela-
tive to neutral trials in the age task for both switch and
repeat trials. Instead, it appears that emotion cues
were still eﬀective in the non-emotional task even
on repeat trials. To further explore the remaining
explanations for a slowdown in switches to emotional
relative to neutral items in the non-emotional task,
Experiment 2 was conducted.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, participants had to switch constantly
between an emotional and a non-emotional task. As
emotion was relevant for one of the competing
tasks, it is possible that it aﬀected performance in
the non-emotional task due to its relevance for the
task block (which included both the emotional and
the non-emotional tasks). In other words, trial-irrele-
vant emotion aﬀected performance as it was block-rel-
evant. Alternatively, emotion might have been
processed in an automatic way due to the salience
of emotion (e.g. Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Phelps et al.,
2006) or the eﬀects were simply due to the diﬃculties
of identifying the emotional face’s age (Ganel, 2015;
Voelkle et al., 2012).
Although switching between emotional and non-
emotional tasks has been investigated before
(Aboulaﬁa-Brakha et al., 2016; de Vries & Geurts,
2012; Gul & Khan, 2014; Johnson, 2009; Paulitzki
et al., 2008; Piguet et al., 2016; Piguet et al., 2013;
Reeck & Egner, 2015; Schuch et al., 2012), so far,
none of the studies has assessed the eﬀect of trial-irre-
levant emotion on performance in a non-emotional
task set. It has neither been investigated whether
emotion has to be relevant for at least one task in
order to aﬀect switching or whether it does so even
if it is block-wise irrelevant. The present experiment
set out to close this empirical gap by investigating
how switching between two non-emotional task sets
is aﬀected by block-wise irrelevant emotion.
In Experiment 2, the two tasks were identifying the
age or gender of a face and participants had to switch
between these two non-emotional tasks in the pres-
ence of happy, neutral and angry expressions. By
introducing two non-emotional tasks with block-wise
irrelevant emotion, this experiment was designed to
distinguish between the following explanations for
longer RTs in response to emotional relative to
neutral items in the non-emotional task in Experiment
1: If longer RTs for emotional rather than neutral
stimuli in the age task were due to diﬃculties to ident-
ify the face’s age in emotional faces, we would expect
to ﬁnd this pattern for the age but not the gender task.
Alternatively, if emotion aﬀected task switching irre-
spective of its relevance for either of the two non-
emotional tasks automatically, we would expect to
ﬁnd longer RTs for emotional than neutral faces in
the age and in the gender task. However, if emotion
aﬀected performance in the non-emotional task due
to reactivation of the competing emotional task
through emotional cues, we would not expect to
ﬁnd an eﬀect of emotion on task switching perform-
ance in the age task in the present experiment.
Methods
Participants
Participants from Experiment 1 also took part in the
present experiment in a single session. Half of partici-
pants started with the task in Experiment 1, whereas
the other half started with the task in Experiment
2. Participants excluded from the analysis in Exper-
iment 1 were also excluded from the analysis in Exper-
iment 2.
Materials
The same stimuli as in Experiment 1 were used.
Procedure
The procedure and counterbalancing were identical to
the procedure for Experiment 1. The only diﬀerence
was that participants were instructed to respond to
the age of the face by pressing one of two buttons
(“young” vs. “old”) when the face was presented
above (or below) the horizontal line and to the
gender of the face by pressing one of two buttons
(“male” vs. “female”) when the face was presented
below (or above) the horizontal line.
Design and statistical analysis
Responses and RTs were recorded for each trial and
the same exclusion criteria were applied as in Exper-
iment 1, resulting in an exclusion of 2.28% of data
points in the younger age group and 2.65% in the
older age group. Accuracy and median RTs for
correct trials were calculated for each condition. As
in Experiment 1, only analyses for switch trials are
reported below. Analyses for repeat trials are reported
in the Supplemental Material. As in Experiment 1,
accuracy and RTs were analysed separately for the
happy vs. neutral and the angry vs. neutral blocks.
COGNITION AND EMOTION 9
Accuracy and RTs were analysed by 2 × 2 × 2 × 2
mixed factors ANOVA including the within-subjects
factors task (age vs. gender), target emotion (happy/
angry vs. neutral) and previous emotion (happy/
angry vs. neutral) as well as the between-subjects
factor age (younger vs. older). Post-hoc t-tests with a
Bonferroni adjustment to the 5% alpha level were per-
formed to follow up signiﬁcant main eﬀects and inter-
actions. Due to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the two age
groups’ verbal knowledge and processing speed, all
analyses were repeated with NART verbal IQ and
Digit Symbol as centred covariates as in Experiment
1. The results with age as a factor reported here
were qualitatively the same and signiﬁcant in the
analysis including covariates unless stated otherwise.
It should also be noted that the order of experiments
interacted with task and with target emotion in the
analysis of accuracy scores in Experiment 1 as well
as with task in the analysis of RTs in Experiment 2
(see Supplemental Material for statistical analyses).
Due to these interactions, all analyses reported in
this paper were repeated with order of experiments
as a covariate. The results reported here were qualitat-
ively the same and signiﬁcant in the analysis including
order of experiments as a covariate.
Results
Happy vs. neutral faces
Accuracy. Accuracy scores for performance in the
happy vs. neutral task block in younger and older
adults are presented in Figure 4 (top panels). The
analysis of accuracy scores yielded a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of target emotion, F(1, 59) = 4.67, MSE = .003,
p = .035, partial η2 = .07, as accuracy was higher for
happy (M = 97.4%, SD = 3.4%) than for neutral trials
(M = 96.4%, SD = 4.7%). This main eﬀect was qualiﬁed
by a target emotion × age interaction, F(1, 59) = 6.51,
MSE = .002, p = .013, partial η2 = .10. Follow-up t-tests
revealed that in younger adults, accuracy was higher
for trials with happy faces (M = 96.6%, SD = 4.3%)
than with neutral faces (M = 94.1%, SD = 5.4%), t(28)
= 2.64, p = .013, whereas in older adults, there was
no diﬀerence in accuracy for trials with happy and
neutral faces (p = .699). There was also a main eﬀect
of age, F(1, 59) = 12.82, MSE = .004, p = .001, partial
η2 = .18, as accuracy was higher in older adults (M =
98.3%, SD = 2.0%) than in younger adults (M = 95.3%,
SD = 4.2%). No further signiﬁcant main eﬀects or inter-
actions were observed for accuracy scores for happy
vs. neutral faces.
Reaction times. RTs for performance in the happy
vs. neutral task block in younger and older adults are
presented in Figure 4 (bottom panels). The analysis
revealed a main eﬀect of task, F(1, 59) = 4.49, MSE
= 38279, p = .038, partial η2 = .07, as RTs were
longer in the age task (M = 1047 ms, SD = 321 ms)
than in the gender task (M = 1011 ms, SD = 286 ms).
There was also a main eﬀect of age, F(1, 59) =
13.42, MSE = 581514, p = .001, partial η2 = .19, driven
by slower RTs in older (M = 1115 ms, SD = 286 ms)
than in younger adults (M = 866 ms, SD = 217 ms).
However, when processing speed was included as
a covariate, this eﬀect became non-signiﬁcant (p
= .199). There were no further signiﬁcant main
eﬀects or interactions for RTs for happy vs. neutral
faces.
Angry vs. neutral faces
Accuracy. Accuracy scores for performance in the
angry vs. neutral task block in younger and older
adults are presented in Figure 5 (top panels). The
analysis yielded a main eﬀect of age, F(1, 59) = 6.72,
MSE = .017, p = .012, partial η2 = .10, as older adults
were more accurate (M = 97.8%, SD = 2.5%) than
younger adults (M = 94.7%, SD = 6.2%). No further sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀects or interactions were observed for
accuracy for angry vs. neutral faces.
Reaction times. RTs for performance in the angry
vs. neutral task block in younger and older adults are
presented in Figure 5 (bottom panels). There was a
trend for a task × target emotion × age interaction, F
(1, 59) = 3.48, MSE = 23123, p = .067, partial η2 = .06.
Separate analyses for the two tasks revealed a trend
for an age × target emotion interaction in the age
task, F(1, 31) = 3.34, MSE = 28387, p = .073, partial η2
= .06, but not in the gender task (p = .439). In the
age task, the interaction was driven by older adults’
slower RTs for angry (M = 1186 ms, SD = 352 ms)
rather than neutral targets (M = 1116 ms, SD =
335 ms), t(31) = 2.56, p = .016, whereas the diﬀerence
was non-signiﬁcant in younger adults (p = .016).
There was also a main eﬀect of age, F(1, 59) = 9.14,
MSE = 594156, p = .004, partial η2 = .13, driven by
slower RTs in older (M = 1142 ms, SD = 307 ms) than
in younger adults (M = 930 ms, SD = 229 ms).
However, when processing speed was included as a
covariate, the eﬀect became non-signiﬁcant (p
= .477). No further signiﬁcant main eﬀects or inter-
actions were observed for RTs for angry vs. neutral
faces.
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Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to assess switching
between two non-emotional tasks in the presence of
block-wise irrelevant emotion in two age groups.
The results revealed that there was no overall eﬀect
of block-wise irrelevant emotion on performance in
either of the two non-emotional tasks. This can help
to interpret ﬁndings from Experiment 1, in which
both age groups showed a slowdown for emotional
relative to neutral items when switching away from
an emotional to a non-emotional task. Given that no
such eﬀect of emotion was observed when partici-
pants had to switch between two non-emotional
tasks in Experiment 2, the data suggest that emotion
has to be task-relevant for one of the competing
tasks in order to aﬀect performance in the non-
emotional task. This is in accordance with research
showing that consistently irrelevant emotional distrac-
tors do not interfere with working memory perform-
ance to a greater extent than neutral distractors
(Miendlarzewska, Van Elswijk, Cannistraci, & van Ee,
2013; Mullin et al., 2012; Ozawa, Matsuda, & Hiraki,
2014). The present ﬁndings also provide strong evi-
dence against the assumption that participants were
slower to perform the age task in the presence of
emotional rather than neutral faces in the previous
experiment due to diﬃculties to identify the age of
an emotional face. No such slowdown for identifying
the face’s age was observed in Experiment 2 despite
the fact that emotional expressions were shown.
Although older adults still showed slightly increased
Figure 4. Accuracy (upper panel) and RTs for correct responses (lower panel) in younger (left-hand panel) and older adults (right-hand panel) as a
function of target emotion and previous emotion in Experiment 2. Participants switched between the age and the gender tasks with block-wise
irrelevant emotion. This ﬁgure shows data from the happy vs. neutral task block. Only switch trials are presented. Error bars represent SEM.
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RTs for angry relative to neutral targets in the present
experiment’s age task, this eﬀect was not found to be
statistically reliable and was also not observed in the
gender task. This ﬁnding could indicate that older
adults processed negative information even if it was
block-wise irrelevant, but the eﬀect does not seem
to generalise to all non-emotional tasks. Future
studies could examine whether and under which cir-
cumstances older adults are aﬀected to a greater
extent than younger adults by block-wise irrelevant
negative information in task switching.
General discussion
The present research was conducted to assess the
eﬀects of emotion on task switching in younger and
older adults and yielded the following main ﬁndings:
First, when switching between emotional and non-
emotional tasks, participants showed slower switch
responses for emotional rather than neutral faces in
the non-emotional task, with no age-related diﬀer-
ences. Second, when switching between two non-
emotional tasks, there was no such slowdown in
switch responses for emotional compared to neutral
faces. Taken together, the results showed that the
impairing eﬀect of task-irrelevant emotion on task
switching is restricted to cases in which emotion is rel-
evant for one of the competing tasks (i.e. trial-irrele-
vant emotion) and does not extend to cases in
which emotion is consistently irrelevant (i.e. block-irre-
levant emotion). This suggests that emotional cues
can delay the reconﬁguration of a non-emotional
Figure 5. Accuracy (upper panel) and RTs for correct responses (lower panel) in younger (left-hand panel) and older adults (right-hand panel) as a
function of target emotion and previous emotion in Experiment 2. Participants switched between the age and the gender tasks with block-wise
irrelevant emotion. This ﬁgure shows data from the angry vs. neutral task block. Only switch trials are presented. Error bars represent SEM.
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task set through the reactivation of the competing
emotional task set.
Impairing eﬀects of task-irrelevant emotion on
task switching
The present study is the ﬁrst to show that task-irrele-
vant emotion can contribute to slower switches com-
pared to neutral task-irrelevant material, but only
when it is relevant for one of the competing tasks.
Importantly, the impairment emerged for the com-
parison between emotional and neutral items in the
non-emotional task, despite the fact that switches to
the non-emotional task set were faster than to the
emotional task set. This pattern of results might help
to explain the inconsistent ﬁndings of previous
studies, which have exclusively focused on switches
between emotional and non-emotional task sets
without taking into account the valence of individual
items in their analyses (Aboulaﬁa-Brakha et al., 2016;
Gul & Khan, 2014; Johnson, 2009; Paulitzki et al.,
2008; Reeck & Egner, 2015; Schuch et al., 2012).
Results showing that switching from an emotional
to a non-emotional task comes at a greater cost
than vice versa (Johnson, 2009; Paulitzki et al., 2008)
were usually interpreted as evidence that disengaging
from an emotional rather than non-emotional task is
more diﬃcult and/or that engaging with an emotional
rather than non-emotional task is less diﬃcult.
However, switches from the emotional to the non-
emotional task were not slower than vice versa in
the present study, and thus, the data provide no
support for this interpretation. In contrast, there is
also evidence that costs are greater for switches to
an emotional from a non-emotional task than vice
versa (Reeck & Egner, 2015), which was interpreted
as evidence for the inhibition of the more dominant
emotional task set to facilitate performance in a less
dominant non-emotional task. As no neutral items
were used in the study by Reeck and Egner (2015),
their design did not allow assessing whether
emotion was indeed inhibited by comparing switch
responses to neutral and emotional items in the
non-emotional task. It should be noted that in the
present study, switch costs were greater when partici-
pants had to switch from a non-emotional to an
emotional task, which is similar to the results reported
by Reeck and Egner (2015). However, the data do not
support an interpretation based on inhibition of the
emotional task set. In the present research, emotional
faces slowed down switches from an emotional to a
non-emotional task, which suggests that there was
no (or at least no successful) emotion inhibition.
Overall, it appears that without distinguishing
responses to neutral and emotional items, the
interpretation of the eﬀects of emotion on task switch-
ing can only be inconsistent or incomplete at best.
The eﬀects of emotion on task set
reconﬁguration vs. task set interference
Taking into account the stimulus valence in a task-
switching paradigm can help disentangling the
eﬀects of emotion on sub-mechanisms involved in
task switching. The literature suggests that both the
reconﬁguration of the new task set and the interfer-
ence of the previous task set are relevant for task
switching. Whereas the reconﬁguration account of
task switching could explain eﬀects of target
emotion on switching, the interference account of
task switching is more suitable to explain eﬀects of
previous emotion on switching. Experiment 1 revealed
that the emotion participants switched to aﬀected
their performance, whereas the emotion they
switched away from did not. Although this ﬁnding
does not rule out that interference played a role in
task switching in Experiment 1, the pattern of results
suggest that it was not aﬀected by emotion. This is
not compatible with suggestions that emotional pro-
cessing is suppressed when participants switch
between emotional and non-emotional tasks (Reeck
& Egner, 2015).
Instead, the results highlight eﬀects of emotion on
task set reconﬁguration as it appears that the reconﬁ-
guration of a non-emotional task set was less eﬃcient
in the presence of trial-irrelevant emotion. As the
slowdown in task switching was observed for
emotional relative to neutral items, it is likely that
emotional items triggered the competing emotional
task set, whereas neutral items did not or less so.
This reactivation of the competing emotional task
set in turn interfered with the reconﬁguration of the
non-emotional task set. It also appears that both
happy and angry faces triggered reactivation, pointing
at an eﬀect of arousal rather than valence. Overall,
these results are in accordance with the suggestion
that exogenous factors play an important role in task
switching through task cueing (Kiesel et al., 2010;
Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubin & Koch, 2006). As
reviewed by Kiesel et al. (2010), stimulus-based task
activation can happen at the level of the response
(i.e. items are processed according to the stimulus-
response mapping of the alternative task) or at the
level of the abstract task set. Given that responses to
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each of the two tasks were assigned to diﬀerent hands
in the present research (i.e. diﬀerent stimulus-
response mappings), it appears that reactivation of
the emotional task set happened at the level of the
abstract task set and not at the response level.
As mentioned above, the reactivation of the com-
peting task set not only aﬀected switch trials from
the emotional to the non-emotional task but also
repeat trials. It is not clear whether this was a short-
term “spill-over” from switch trials or whether it was
a longer-lasting reactivation eﬀect. In the present
study, only one repeat trial per task was included
and thus, it is diﬃcult to evaluate the eﬀect’s longev-
ity. Future studies could explore whether the reactiva-
tion of the competing task set diminishes with an
increasing number of repeat trials or not (e.g. when
participants switch every four rather than every two
trials). The former would speak in favour of a short-
term eﬀect, whereas the latter would suggest that
there is sustained reactivation of the competing task
set. Furthermore, future studies could investigate
whether higher ﬂexibility of emotional relative to
non-emotional task sets as reported by Schuch et al.
(2012) is associated with emotional task sets’ greater
susceptibility to reactivation that were observed in
the present study. Also, stimuli were presented repeat-
edly in our study, which could have allowed for rapid
stimulus-response learning (e.g. Schnyer et al., 2007).
As the association of a stimulus with a particular
response can facilitate and impair subsequent
responses and item presentation was random in our
study, it is unlikely that rapid stimulus-response learn-
ing can account for the impairing eﬀects of task-irrele-
vant emotion on task switching. However, future
studies could assess the role of stimulus-response
learning in task set reconﬁguration.
No age-related diﬀerences in the eﬀects of task-
irrelevant emotion on task switching
This research was the ﬁrst to examine the eﬀects of
emotion on task switching in ageing and no age-
related diﬀerences were observed. Contrary to the
hypotheses, happy faces did not facilitate engage-
ment with or the disengagement from a task in
older relative to younger adults. Moreover, there was
no evidence of age-related impairments in perform-
ance, which is in line with research showing that
local task switching is largely unaﬀected in ageing
(for a meta-analysis, see Wasylyshyn et al., 2011). The
present research was not designed to distinguish
between diﬀerent theoretical accounts that have
been suggested to explain how emotion-cognition
interactions change with age. However, it is possible
to speculate on the suitability of diﬀerent accounts
based on the present ﬁndings.
Older adults’ very high accuracy rates in the two
experiments suggest that they were not functioning
at the limit of their cognitive capacity and that
additional cognitive resources were likely available.
Despite the availability of cognitive resources,
emotion did not aﬀect older and younger adults diﬀer-
ently. This does not directly support the SST (Carsten-
sen, 1993), according to which older adults use
available cognitive resources to focus on emotional
and particularly positive information in order to
enhance wellbeing. The results are only reconcilable
with the SST when considering that speciﬁc task
goals may supplant chronically active emotion regu-
lation goals in older adults (for a review, see Reed &
Carstensen, 2012). In the present study, speciﬁc
instructions were used to direct the participants’
attention to particular item features (i.e. emotion,
age or gender of faces), which might have hindered
the processing of emotional stimuli in a motivation-
based way. It should be noted, however, that studies
with similar restrictive task instructions in the
domain of working memory have observed age-
related diﬀerences in emotion-cognition interactions
and interpreted these within the framework of SST
(e.g. Borg, Leroy, Favre, Laurent, & Thomas-Antérion,
2011; Truong & Yang, 2014). Thus, it is diﬃcult to
assess the validity of the theory if the role of task
instructions for age-related emotion biases is not con-
sistently considered as a relevant factor. In contrast,
the data are fully compatible with the dynamic inte-
gration theory (Labouvie-Vief, 2003, 2009; Labouvie-
Vief & González, 2004), which suggests that emotional
biases in ageing reﬂect a compensatory strategy as
they help to buﬀer the eﬀects of cognitive decline.
As the task was not too diﬃcult for older adults, it is
likely that no compensation for insuﬃcient cognitive
resources through biased processing of emotional
material was needed. Future studies should explore
this further by testing whether age-related changes
in the eﬀects of emotion on task switching emerge
with increased task diﬃculty, which would provide
support for a decline-based account.
Conclusion
To conclude, the present study was the ﬁrst to inves-
tigate the eﬀects of emotion on task switching in
younger and older adults. The study revealed that
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task-irrelevant emotion impaired switching in both
age groups, but only when emotion was relevant for
one of the competing tasks. The results suggest that
the impairing eﬀect of task-irrelevant emotion in a
non-emotional task was due to the reactivation of
the competing emotional task. They also suggest
that local task switching and the ability to shield
task-switching performance from block-wise irrelevant
emotion are preserved in ageing.
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